---
title: "Strong Passwords and Account Protection"
domain: cybersecurity
level: foundations
duration: "30 min"
objectives:
  - Explain how attackers guess or steal passwords and why reused passwords are dangerous.
  - Create a long, memorable passphrase and judge whether a password is strong.
  - Explain what a password manager does and how to start using one.
  - Turn on two-step verification (2FA) on an account and keep the recovery codes safe.
---

# Strong Passwords and Account Protection

## Why this matters
Imagine you joined an online forum for gardeners in 2019 and used the same password you use for your email. Years later the forum is hacked and its list of passwords is published. Nobody hacks you personally: a program simply tries your email address and that password on email, banks and shops, thousands of accounts per minute. If it works on your email, the attacker can click "Forgot password?" on everything else.

A few habits stop almost all of this, and this lesson teaches them.

## Learning objectives
- Explain how attackers guess or steal passwords and why reused passwords are dangerous.
- Create a long, memorable passphrase and judge whether a password is strong.
- Explain what a password manager does and how to start using one.
- Turn on two-step verification (2FA) on an account and keep the recovery codes safe.

## Key concepts

### Why your accounts matter, and your email most of all
An **account** is your identity on a website or app: a username (often your email address) plus a **password**, a secret only you should know. The service checks the secret to decide that you are you.

Your email account is like the master key on a ring. When you click "Forgot password?" on a bank, shop or social network, the service sends a **reset link** to your email. Whoever can read your email can therefore choose a new password for every other account. This is why your email password must be your strongest and must never be reused.

![Four accounts (bank, online shop, social network and photo storage) on the left, each with an arrow labelled "Forgot password?" pointing to a card on the right: your email account. The card says every reset link lands there and whoever controls it can reset all the others.](../../../assets/diagrams/passwords-email-master-key.svg)

*Figure 1. Every "Forgot password?" button leads to your email account, so protecting it protects everything else.*

> [!CHECK]
> Why is your email account the most important one to protect?
>
> - [ ] It stores the most photos and documents.
> - [x] Password-reset links for your other accounts are sent to it.
> - [ ] It is the only account that has a password.
>
> Whoever controls your email can reset the passwords of your other accounts, so it works as a master key.

### How passwords get stolen or guessed
There are three common ways, and only one of them needs any skill.

**1. Data breaches and reuse.** A **data breach** happens when attackers get into a company's systems and copy its data, sometimes including emails and passwords. Breaches are frequent and affect even large companies. If you used the same password elsewhere, it is now exposed there too. Attackers know this, so they run **credential stuffing**: software takes the leaked pairs of email and password and tries each pair on other popular websites. It is cheap, automatic and works whenever people **reuse** a password.

![Four numbered steps. 1: a small site you joined years ago is breached and its list of emails and passwords leaks online. 2: attackers get the list and know your email and the password you used there, for example Mango2024!. 3: software tries that same pair on email, bank and shops, called credential stuffing. 4: reuse decides the damage; with the same password other accounts open, with a unique password only the forum is affected.](../../../assets/diagrams/passwords-reuse.svg)

*Figure 2. The forum was breached, but only reuse lets the damage spread to your other accounts.*

**2. Guessing.** Most people choose passwords that are easy to remember, so they are easy to guess. Attackers keep lists of the most common passwords (`123456`, `password`, `qwerty`, names, football teams) and common patterns (a word, a capital first letter, a year, an exclamation mark, like `Summer2024!`). Software tries millions of such guesses, including look-alike swaps like `P@ssw0rd`.

**3. Phishing.** **Phishing** is a fake message or website that tricks you into typing your password yourself, for example an email that says "your account is locked, log in here". No guessing is needed because you hand the password over. The next module, [Recognising Phishing and Scams](../02-phishing-and-scams/README.md), covers how to spot it. For now, remember that a strong password does not protect you from giving it away. Two-step verification, covered below, helps with that.

> [!CHECK]
> A small website you joined years ago is hacked and its passwords leak. Which habit stops this from affecting your bank account?
>
> - [ ] Choosing a password with a capital letter and a symbol.
> - [ ] Changing the password every month.
> - [x] Using a different password for the bank than for the website.
> - [ ] Hoping the attackers are not interested in you.
>
> Credential stuffing only works when the same password is reused. A unique password limits the damage to the one site that was breached.

### What makes a password strong
A strong password is one that is **hard to guess**. Two things matter most: **length** and **unpredictability**.

Length matters because every extra character multiplies the number of possible passwords. Unpredictability matters because attackers try likely passwords first.

This leads to a surprising rule: **length beats complexity**. A short password full of symbols, like `Qx7$mL2!`, is hard to remember and still short. Four or five random words, like `harbor violin pebble orbit maple`, are much longer, easier to remember and harder to guess. This is called a **passphrase**.

A good passphrase follows three rules:

- **Several random words**, at least four. Random means picked by dice or a computer, not a sentence you made up or a quote from a song.
- **Never a famous phrase**, a lyric, or facts about you (pets, birthdays, addresses).
- **Different for each account.** One passphrase per account, never shared.

![Three example passwords with a bar showing their length. Summer2024! has 11 characters and is predictable. Qx7$mL2! has 8 characters and is short and hard to remember. The passphrase harbor violin pebble orbit maple has 32 characters, five random words, long, memorable and very hard to guess. All three are invented examples.](../../../assets/diagrams/passwords-strength.svg)

*Figure 3. The longest password is also the easiest to remember, and the one that looks plain is the strongest.*

You cannot remember a different passphrase for 80 accounts, and you do not need to: the next section solves that.

> [!CHECK]
> Which password is hardest for software to guess?
>
> - [ ] `P@ssw0rd!` (a common word with symbols swapped in)
> - [ ] `Summer2024!` (a word, a year and a symbol)
> - [x] `lantern copper meadow quartz saddle` (five random words)
> - [ ] `Qx7$mL2!` (random, but only 8 characters)
>
> Five random words are long and unpredictable. The first two follow patterns attackers try first, and the last is short.

### What current guidance says
You may have been told to include capitals, digits and symbols and to change your password every few months. That advice is outdated. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (**NIST**) publishes guidance that many organisations follow, in the document SP 800-63B-4. In plain terms it says:

- **Make passwords long.** When a password is the only protection, services should require at least 15 characters, and should accept very long ones (at least 64).
- **Do not force complexity rules.** Rules like "one capital, one digit, one symbol" push people to predictable choices such as `Password1!`.
- **Do not force regular changes.** Changing only because a calendar says so leads to small, guessable edits. Change a password when there is a reason: you suspect it leaked, or a service tells you it was breached.
- **Allow paste and password managers**, and block common or leaked passwords.

### Password managers
A **password manager** is an app that stores all your passwords in an encrypted **vault** (a locked digital safe). It creates long random passwords for you, fills them in on the right websites, and remembers them. You remember only one thing: the **master passphrase** that unlocks the vault.

That master passphrase is the most important password you own, so:

- Make it a long passphrase of random words, as above.
- Never reuse it anywhere else and never store it in the vault.
- Turn on two-step verification for the manager itself, if it offers it.

There are two kinds of manager, and either is far better than reusing passwords:

| | Built into a browser or phone | Dedicated app |
|---|---|---|
| What it is | Part of the browser or the phone system | A separate app or browser add-on |
| Strengths | Already installed, free, easy | Works across all browsers and devices, extra features like secure sharing |
| Watch out for | Often tied to one browser or ecosystem; protect the device and the account that syncs it | May cost money; you must trust the vendor and keep the master passphrase |

The best manager is the one you will actually use. Do not move everything at once: start with email and bank, then add accounts as you log in over the following weeks.

A reputable manager stores the vault encrypted, so a thief who copies it still needs your master passphrase. Keeping everything in one place is less risky than reusing passwords.

> [!CHECK]
> What do you need to remember when you use a password manager?
>
> - [ ] Every password, so you can type it if the app fails.
> - [ ] One short password that you also use for your email.
> - [x] One long master passphrase that you use nowhere else.
> - [ ] Nothing: the app works without any password.
>
> The manager remembers the rest. Its master passphrase protects the whole vault, so it must be strong and unique.

### Two-step verification and recovery codes
Even a strong password can be stolen by phishing or leaked in a breach. **Two-step verification** (also called **two-factor authentication**, or **2FA**, or **multi-factor authentication**) adds a second check. A **factor** is a kind of proof. Proofs come in three kinds: something you **know** (a password), something you **have** (your phone or a key) and something you **are** (a fingerprint or face). Two-step verification combines two kinds, so a thief with only your password cannot get in.

![Three steps. Your password, something you know, typed as usual. A second proof, something you have, such as a code or tap on your phone. Then you are in, because a stolen password alone is not enough. Below, three options for the second step, strongest on the left: an authenticator app, a security key or passkey, and an SMS text-message code.](../../../assets/diagrams/passwords-two-step.svg)

*Figure 4. The second step proves you hold something an attacker who stole your password does not.*

There are several ways to do the second step:

| Method | How it works | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| **Authenticator app** | An app on your phone shows a 6-digit code that changes every 30 seconds | A good default: works without mobile signal and is not sent over the phone network |
| **Security key or passkey** | A small physical key you touch, or a **passkey** stored on your phone or computer that you unlock with a fingerprint, face or PIN | Strongest: it only works on the real website, so a fake site cannot steal it |
| **SMS code** | A text message with a code | Better than nothing, but weaker: phone numbers can be taken over by a trick called SIM swapping |

Use the strongest method the service offers, and any 2FA is better than none.

When you turn on 2FA, the service gives you **recovery codes**: a short list of one-time codes for the day you lose your phone. Treat them like cash: save them somewhere safe and **separate from your phone**, such as printed on paper in a safe place or in your password manager. Never leave them in an unprotected note or a photo that syncs to the cloud. Without them, a lost phone can lock you out of your account for good.

> [!CHECK]
> You turn on 2FA and the service shows ten recovery codes. What should you do?
>
> - [ ] Ignore them; you will never lose your phone.
> - [ ] Post a photo of them in a chat with yourself.
> - [x] Store them somewhere safe that is not your phone.
> - [ ] Share them with a friend so you can both log in.
>
> Recovery codes are your way back in if you lose your second factor, so they must be safe, private and independent of the phone.

## How it works
A simple routine protects your accounts:

1. **Start with your email.** Give it a new unique passphrase and turn on 2FA.
2. **Install a password manager** and set a strong master passphrase.
3. **Replace passwords** one account at a time: email, bank, then main social accounts.
4. **Turn on 2FA** everywhere it is offered, and store the recovery codes.
5. **Check for breaches** from time to time, and act on the result.

[Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/) shows which known breaches included your email address. If your email is **not** found, that is good news but not a guarantee: it only knows public breaches. If it is found, do not panic: change the password of that service (and anywhere you reused it), turn on 2FA and watch for phishing that mentions that service. The site only needs your email, never your password.

## Worked example
Sam has the same password, `Mango2024!`, on email, a shop and a cooking forum. The forum is breached.

On day 0 the forum's passwords leak, and the list contains `sam@example.com` and `Mango2024!`. On day 1 software tries that pair on email and shops, and it works on both. The attacker then uses "Forgot password?" from the email to take over more accounts.

Had Sam used a unique passphrase per account in a password manager, and 2FA on email, the same breach would have cost Sam one forum account.

## Common pitfalls
- **Reusing a password "just for unimportant sites"** — attackers do not know which sites you consider unimportant, and the shop may hold your address and card details. Use a unique password everywhere; the manager makes it painless.
- **Adding a number to the same base** — `Mango2024!` and `Mango2025!` are almost the same password to an attacker. Make each one truly different.
- **Using personal facts** — names, birthdays and pets can be found on social media.
- **Not saving recovery codes** — you then discover the problem exactly when you lose the phone.

## Security considerations
- Never tell anyone your password, recovery codes or 2FA codes, even if they say they are support staff.
- Protect the phone or computer that holds your manager and authenticator with a screen lock.
- If you suspect an account was taken over, change its password from a device you trust, then review recent activity and the account's recovery email and phone number.
- Use these ideas only on your own accounts. Trying other people's passwords is illegal.

## Summary
- Your email is the master key: it resets your other accounts, so protect it most.
- Attackers use leaks, guessing and phishing; credential stuffing works because people reuse passwords.
- Long beats complex: use passphrases of several random words, a different one for every account.
- A password manager remembers everything for you; protect it with one strong, unique master passphrase.
- Turn on two-step verification, prefer an authenticator app or passkey to SMS, and store recovery codes safely away from your phone.
- Check Have I Been Pwned from time to time and act on what it shows.

## Glossary
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| account | Your identity on a website or app, usually a username or email plus a password. |
| password | A secret you type to prove you are the owner of an account. |
| reset link | A message the service sends to your email so you can choose a new password. |
| data breach | An incident in which attackers copy a company's data, sometimes including emails and passwords. |
| credential stuffing | Software that tries leaked email and password pairs on many other websites. |
| reuse | Using the same password on more than one account. |
| phishing | A fake message or website that tricks you into giving away a password or other secret. |
| passphrase | A long password made of several random words. |
| password manager | An app that creates, stores and fills in passwords in an encrypted vault. |
| vault | The encrypted storage inside a password manager. |
| master passphrase | The one long passphrase that unlocks a password manager's vault. |
| two-step verification | Signing in with two proofs of identity of different kinds, for example a password and a code from your phone. Also called two-factor authentication (2FA) or multi-factor authentication. |
| factor | One kind of proof: something you know, have or are. |
| authenticator app | A phone app that shows a short code that changes every 30 seconds. |
| passkey | A modern replacement for a password: a secret stored on your device and unlocked with a fingerprint, face or PIN; it only works on the real site. |
| recovery codes | One-time codes the service gives you to get back into an account if you lose your second factor. |
| SIM swapping | A trick in which a criminal gets your phone number moved to their SIM card to receive your SMS codes. |
| NIST | The US National Institute of Standards and Technology, which publishes widely used security guidance. |

## Check your understanding
1. Explain in your own words why reusing one password on many sites is dangerous even if the password is strong.
2. A friend says: "My password is `Dr@gon!99`, it has a capital, a symbol and numbers, so it must be strong." What would you tell them, and what would you suggest instead?

## References
- [NIST SP 800-63B-4: Authentication and Authenticator Management](https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html)
- [Have I Been Pwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/)
